

Development and Public Policy

Pavel Kuchař, Fall 2015

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Tuesdays and Thursdays 6:00 pm – 8:00 pm

Room A-200, DCEA, University of Guanajuato

In this course we will look into the nature of the wealth of nations. Why some nations are rich and others remain poor? What answers can economics give us about development?

We will see what the current state of the field is; students will acquire the tools necessary to analyze the questions of development and learn how to argue about development and public policy.

The goal of this course is to develop a research project that will investigate questions of development and public policy.

Literature

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Topics

1) Introduction

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2) What is Development Economics? What are the Goals of Development?

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- Sen, Amartya (1999). *Development as Freedom*, New York: Anchor Books. Chps. 1-3.
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4) Information and Incentives

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5) Institutions and Development

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6) Entrepreneurship and Institutions

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8) Economic Analysis of Law

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9) Geography

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10) Emergent Patterns, Spontaneous Order, Anarchy and Development

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11) Beliefs and Culture

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Evaluation

The main course requirement is a research paper on any topic of your choice broadly related to the material covered in class. The **3000 words essay** will **count for 60%** of the grade. The quality of the argument (a valid claim, persuasive reasoning and/or evidence supporting the claim) along with formal language aspects will be considered. Students will be required to participate in peer review. The goal is to find an interesting idea and begin to think about how to apply the tools from this course to its analysis. We will devote some time to brief presentations of research proposals.

A number of **problem sets** will be assigned throughout the semester. The solution of these problem sets will be **worth 40%** of your final grade. The evaluation ranges from 0 to 10 through increments of 0.5. Only an evaluation equal or greater than 7 counts as a pass. The working language of the course is English.

Policies

Unless you have an official leave of absence confirmed by the university, there is no way of making up for scheduled exams in case you cannot take them. If you do not take the exam or fail to submit an assignment in time you will receive an evaluation of zero for this exam or assignment. If you have an official leave of absence, please talk to me immediately. Even if you do not have an official leave of absence, it is generally recommended you turn in the assignment anyway. In such a case your evaluation will be discounted by 20% for each day you are late. In case you had a conflict with another exam, please approach me as soon as possible.

- Come to class on time!
- Turn off any electronic device that might possibly make a sound during the class
- Do not eat, drink, read newspapers, magazines or similar. Do not maintain conversations irrelevant to our work in the class.

Disability assistance

If you need any special disability assistance please let me know during the first week of the semester so that I can arrange for the required help.

Academic integrity

In this class we follow the Academic Integrity Code:

„No student will lie or cheat or plagiarize or tolerate those who do so.“

At the moment of entering the University, every student assumes an obligation to maintain the code, accept the responsibility to learn and to follow the philosophy of professional ethics. It is required that students apply the code while taking exams, submitting assignments or working on their research. Ignoring the rules does not excuse any person from being subject to a corresponding punishment. In case there is an evidence of a conduct breaching the Academic Integrity Code, the student will be assigned an evaluation of zero in the corresponding exam or assignment. Furthermore, the student will be subject to an administrative process carried out by the Committee of Honor and Justice of the DCEA which has the power to suspend or expel the student that has been found guilty. Please do not plagiarize. Realize that if you found it online, I can do so too! What is appreciated is your effort in learning, not the possession of a solution. If you are not sure what plagiarism is, consult [this source](#).

Code of behavior in my classroom

As a student you will

- Contribute to a constructive conversation, be concise.
- Tackle the argument not the person, no insults.
- Remember that raising your voice does not make you any more persuasive

As your lecturer I will

- Guide you through the subject matter in a more interesting way
- Consider your ideas with full attention
- Attend to your needs so that you benefit from our time together as much as possible